It's too bad there is so much uninformed thinking about the bank "bailouts."
The seeds of the 2008 crisis were much the same as the seeds for the bank failures in 1929 and the Great Depression which followed - the combination of commercial banking functions (credit services and payment systems) with investment banking (forming investment pools of capital.)
The banking system we established after the crash divided commercial banking from investment banking.
Commercial banks handled deposits, extensions of credit (lending) and especially our payment systems - originally check clearing, but also wire transfers and generally almost all payments in the stream of commerce. (No payment systems, no commerce. High risk payment systems, high costs for commerce.)
These three functions are so important to a smoothly running economy that we deemed the large commercial banks to be covered by an implicit "guarantee" of our central bank. the Fed" as the "lender of last resort. (That did not mean all banks would be automatically bailed out if they were failing - it did mean that the fed would support them in times of need.)
Payment systems are particularly vulnerable to cascading system failures - and without effective and safe payment systems, our economy as we know it could not survive.
Commercial banks were covered by a comprehensive set of regulations geared to assure the "safety and soundness" of the banks and the banking system.
Commercial banks were considered low risk, and thus low investment return.
Investment banks pooled the money of investors (excess capital) and disperse it as investment capital.
With investment banking, there is not the systemic risk that the payment systems have, and the money is money intentionally put at risk in investments.
The investment banking sector was high risk, high reward, with relatively few regulations beyond attempts to reduce business fraud.
For reasons not really germane here, commercial banks were, profits wise, sucking wind starting in the late 80s.
The "fix" was to allow commercial banks and investment banks to merge (through the 'repeal' of that separation in the Glass-Steagall Act) - bringing the high risk functions of the investment banks under the Fed's "lender of last resort" function so necessary for the payment systems and the universal need for credit.
And thus, we had the inevitable investment banking failures of 2008 and the inevitably critical need for the "bailouts" to rescue the credit and payment system functions.